Dcsync event id 4662. This appears to be a false positive

Later @4ndr3w6S shared a tweet from @cnotin where @cnotin & @exploitph … This blog shows how Wazuh can detect some common Active Directory attacks using Windows security logs and events captured on Sysmon 首先看一下EventID 4662的样子 0x01 什么情况下会产生该日志呢？ 该日志出现在对Active Directory Object设置SACL时会出现 0x02 为什么要监控该日志呢？ Using CDB list To show you an example of how to modify the rule I would like to know the format in which events are collected (Eventlog or Eventchannel) and the Wazuh rule's ID which … A valuable data source in analyzing changes to properties in Active Directory is Event ID 4662 in the Windows Security log on Domain Controllers, which logs access to Active Directory objects. How can DCSync attacks be detected? Monitoring event logs, particularly Event ID 4624’s TargetLogonId, along with employing machine learning for anomaly detection in user behavior, is essential for effectively identifying … Active Directory event logs – namely Event IDs 5136 and 4662 – provide for basic real-time monitoring of ACL changes and can be used to detect the domain-level “Add/remove replica in … Learn how DCSync attacks exploit AD replication to steal credentials, with detection to prevention clues. Endpoint detection Fortunately for enterprises that do not have access to Zeek logs, Windows can log the use of permissions (such as Replicating Directory Changes All) required for DCSync. Finally, collecting Windows event logs for replication events and AD object changes (such as Event ID 4662) might help with additional monitoring. This appears to be a false positive. Learn detection methods, MITRE ATT&CK mappings, and threat hunting techniques for Windows So dropping all 4662 events, except if they match any of these GUIDs. This rule monitors for when a Windows Event ID 4662 (Operation was performed on an Active Directory object) with the access mask 0x100 (Control Access) and properties that contain at … DCSync We need to filter out our domain controllers from this. 5 hours because the security log was filling faster than the forwarder could send and index the events. Event ID 4624: Logs successful logins, which can help identify unusual login activities or … Detecting DCSync is easy because each Domain Controller replication generates an event with the ID 4662 . Since Splunk instance is set to dump event 4662 to a null queue so it … Updated Date: 2025-05-02 ID: 71b289db-5f2c-4c43-8256-8bf26ae7324a Author: Steven Dick Type: Anomaly Product: Splunk Enterprise Security Description The following analytic identifies a … Introduction This blog outlines detection strategies for over 20 real-world Active Directory attack techniques. However, there are some key indicators that can help in identifying suspicious activity: Windows Security Log Event ID 4662: An … Many instances of Event ID 4662 will be displayed when the Python script is executed, indicating attempts to synchronize information between the Active Directory (AD) and the client. In the Windows Security logs (C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\ Security. Look for entries that specify the access rights DS-Replication-Get-Changes or DS … DCSync attack explained: Learn how attackers use malicious replication of directory services to extract credentials from Active Directory. Focus specifically on GUIDs related to “Replicating Directory Changes” and “Replicating Directory Changes All” permissions. g. Legitimate DCSync should only be performed by machine accounts or SYSTEM, not users. It is important to note that this event ID is not enabled by default and must be explicitly … Legitimate DCSync should only be performed by machine accounts or SYSTEM, not users. [8] Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over a legacy replication protocol. Focus on event ID 4662, which logs directory service access. Detection DS-Replication-Get-Changes operations can be recorded with Event ID 4662. We can pick up abnormal requests immediately by monitoring for this event … Contribute to elastic/detection-rules development by creating an account on GitHub. This will tell you where the AD replication request came from, and if it … DCSync is a legitimate Active Directory feature that domain controllers only use for replicating changes, but illegitimate security principals can also use it. I have given an example that does this by removing SYNC events where the AccountType is a Machine and where the … option leaving us with the Event ID. Detecting DCSync attacks is challenging because they leverage legitimate AD replication functionality. Monitoring traffic moving across the … One method is to monitor Windows event logs for Event ID 4662. id) on the Domain Controller (DC) that received the replication request. Updated Date: 2025-08-11 ID: 50998483-bb15-457b-a870-965080d9e3d3 Author: Dean Luxton Type: TTP Product: Splunk Enterprise Security Description The following analytic identifies unauthorized … Correlate security events 4662 and 4624 (Logon Type 3) by their Logon ID (winlog.

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